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CHRISTIANITY AS PART OF THE COMMON LAW
JAYSON L. SPIEGEL*
INTRODUCTION
It cannot be controverted that religion plays a central role in Ameri-
can society. Perhaps the greatest genius of American society has been
that by incorporating a promise of maximum freedom of conscience
into the United States Constitution, we have guaranteed everyone the
right to follow their conscience while assuring them that they will never
suffer from official discrimination because their beliefs are inconsistent
with those of the majority of the population. Although freedom of reli-
gion is not absolute,' there has been a continual progression toward
maximizing religious liberty.2
In 1952, Justice Douglas wrote these immortal words:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of
man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of govern-
ment that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flour-
ish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
3
Notwithstanding the American tradition of separation of church and
state, there is a constant interaction between our religious and political
institutions. As Justice Douglas himself wrote, the Constitution "does
not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of
church and state."4 Indeed, each has greatly influenced the other. Our
founding fathers were guided by their religious convictions in formu-
lating our constitutional system and its attendant guarantees of liberty.5
Similarly, religious liberty and the guarantee of full political rights for
all regardless of faith were won not through violence but through the
political and legal system.6 Although the United States Supreme Court
* J.D., 1983, University of Virginia.
1. The United States Supreme Court recognized long ago that although freedom to believe
is absolute, the state may prohibit activities undertaken in the name of religion which are injurious
to society. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (prohibition of polygamy
upheld against freedom of religion challenge).
2. See generally A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1964).
3. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
4. Id at 312.
5. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 9-20, 39-55.
6. See id. at 64-83.
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has often moved to limit the overt government sponsorship of public
symbols or ceremonies that are blatantly denominational or sectarian,7
it is still accurate to say that our religious heritage has so pervasively
impacted upon our political system as to create an almost seamless web
of religious influence upon our public institutions.
In the early days of the Republic, and indeed until the explosion of
religious liberty cases that began about 1947,8 the influence of religious
and moral principles upon our laws was often expressed in the concept
that "Christianity is part of the common law of the United States." As
late as 1931, the United States Supreme Court pronounced, "[wie are a
Christian people."9 Regardless of how one interprets this judicial dicta,
it cannot be gainsaid that the teachings of Christianity have had a per-
vasive impact upon all aspects of our legal system. The very essence of
our criminal system and the bulk of the acts which we criminalize
emerge from the Judaeo-Christian tradition;"° in fact, crimes have
often been defined in terms of being offensive to Christianity. The
influence of Christianity upon the law of domestic relations has per-
haps been even more extensive.'
2
Although the Gospels themselves have specifically had a significant
impact upon the development of our law, Christianity has influenced
the law in another and perhaps more important sense. In the denota-
tive sense, to be a Christian refers to an individual who embraces the
religion which recognizes the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth. Many of
our laws are derived in some form from the Gospels and teachings of
the Christian religion. Blasphemy and Sunday Closing statutes are two
examples.' 3 In the connotative sense, however, to be a Christian refers
to an individual who manifests a peaceful, charitable, humble or loving
nature. Our laws represent a concerted effort to foster these attributes
in society and increase harmony and brotherhood.' 4 Although there
are substantive due process limitations on the extent to which morality
7. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). -
8. The starting point for the post-war explosion of religious liberty cases is Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
10. See, e.g., I Timothy 1:9-10 wherein lawlessness, patricide, matricide, whoremongering,
murder, fornication, sexual perversion, kidnapping, lying, and perjury are condemned as contrary
to the law. See alsoIsaacs, The Common Law of the Bible, 7 A.B.A.J. 117 (1921) for an excellent
treatment of the Old Testament influence upon criminal law.
Ii. The offense of "crime against nature" has often been defined as simply "[tihe abominable
crime not fit to be named among Christians." Hounselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 48 N.E. 304
(1897).
12. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 32-33, 642-50 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Kilgour v. Miks, 6 G. & J. 268, 274 (Md. 1834) where the Maryland Court of
Appeals wrote that "Ours is a christian community, and a day set apart as the day of rest, con-
secrated by the resurrection of our Saviour, and embraces the next twenty-four hours next ensuing
the midnight of Saturday."
14. The preamble to the federal Constitution provides that the Constitution is established to
2
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may be legislated,' 5 our statute books and court reports are full of in-
stances where the law seeks to guide our behavior towards a moral end.
For example, the deduction of charitable contributions allowed by the
Internal Revenue Code' 6 is designed specifically to induce contribu-
tions to charity. Since our religious heritage has had such a far-reach-
ing impact upon our legal system, this paper will analyze the history of
the doctrine that Christianity is part of the common law.
II. THE COMMON LAW
According to Black's Law Dictionary, common law is defined as
follows:
As distinguished from law created by the enactment of legislatures, the
common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action,
relating to the government and security of persons and property, which
derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial
antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing,
affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs. 17
The common law's origins are indeed shrouded in history since its
precepts have been derived from Greek, Roman, Mosaic, Germanic
and Christian jurisprudence.' s Scholars have maintained that despite
the disparate origins of the common law it has at all times been derived
from "general rules binding on all men as moral and rational beings,
and discoverable by human reason without any special aid of revela-
tion. "' Accordingly, everyone can equally ascertain this law of nature
by rational processes.2" As Lord Coke wrote,
For reason is the life of the law nay the common law itselfe is nothing
else but reason, which is to be understood of an artificial perfection of
reason, gotten by long study, observation and experience, and not of
every man's natural reason; for nemo nascitur artqfex . . no man out
of his own private reason ought to be wiser than the law, which is the
perfection of reason.21
The touchstone of the rational process which yields the common law
has been referred to as "first principles, '"22 or more commonly, "natural
law." Natural law, according to Pound, generally refers to the "princi-
"establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the gen-
eral Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty..." U.S. CONST. preamble.
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 170a (1982). See 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 246 (1972).
17. BLACKS'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
18. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (1881).
19. F. POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (1912).
20. Id.
21. R. POUND & T. PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY & SYSTEM OF THE COMMON
LAW v (3d ed. 1927) (citing COKE ON LITTLETON 976 (1628)).
22. Id. (citing ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT ch. 5 (1523)).
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pies which philosophy and ethics discover as those which should gov-
ern human actions and relations."23 As prelates trained in Christian
philosophy came to dominate the English legal system, English juris-
prudence came to recognize the natural law, to which the church is
loyal, as controlling.2" The great English legal minds including John of
Salisbury, Fortescue, St. German, Coke, Holt, and Blackstone, em-
braced the notion that since the common law is derived from natural
law, and, therefore, from the law of God, any act of Parliament incon-
sistent with this law would be void.25
This is not to say that the common law is a static concept. As
Holmes explains, it is "always approaching, and never reaching, consis-
tency."' 26 By following precedents and providing reasons for decisions,
judges continually refine the law.27 He writes:
[L]ife of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even [w]hen, the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good
deal to do . . .in determining the rules by which men are governed.2 s
The law finds new reasons to justify timeless truths, when the old rea-
sons are no longer suitable.29 As Pollock writes, "[T]he Genius of the
[common law] has somehow contrived to extract from all the theoreti-
cal confusion a body of law which is quite well understood by those
who handle it, and quite sufficient for every day needs, and how the
reputation of being, on the whole just and merciful."3
III. EARLY ENGLISH CASES
Leading English jurisprudents have long considered the law of God
to be part of the law of England. Also, the Church of England is "es-
tablished" in the Erastian sense, with the king as "the only supreme
head on earth of the Church of England."'" As a result of these two
factors it is not surprising that English courts often looked to Christian-
ity for the content of their decisions.
One of the earliest recorded instances of a court relying explicitly on
Christian doctrine was in Calvin's Case,3 2 wherein Lord Coke, relying
23. Id. at 8.
24. R. O'SULLIVAN, CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE COMMON LAW 24 (1947).
25. R. POUND & T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 21, at 33 (citing I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES 41; Bonham's case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610)).
26. 0. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 36.
27. Id at 37.
28. Id at 1.
29. Id. at 36.
30. F. POLLOCK, supra note 19, at 87.
31. Act of Supremacy, 26 Hen. 8 c.l (1534).
32. 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608).
4
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on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, held that infidels could not
maintain an action in court.33 Years later, this holding was severely
criticized by Chief Justice Willes, who wrote, "Even the devils them-
selves, whose subjects, [Lord Coke] says, the heathens are, cannot have
worse principles: and besides the irreligion of it, it is a most impolitic
notion and would at once destroy all that trade and commerce from
which all this nation reaps such good benefits.
3 4
However, the leading early English opinion in this area is Taylor's
Case. It is worth setting out in full:
An information exhibited against him in the Crown-Office, for uttering
of divers blasphemous expressions, horrible to hear, [viz.] that Jesus
Christ was a bastard, a whoremaster, religion was a cheat; and that he
neither feared God, the devil, or man.
Being upon his trial, he acknowledged the speaking of the words,
except the word bastard; and for the rest, he pretended to mean them in
another sense than they ordinarily bear, [viz.] whoremaster, i.e. that
Christ was master of the whore of Babylon, and such kind of evasions
for the rest. But all the words being proved by several witnesses, he
was found guilty.
And Hale said, that such kind of wicked blasphemous words were
not only an offence to God and religion, but a crime against the laws,
State and Government, and therefore punishable in this Court. For to
say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the
civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel of the laws
of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak
in subversion of the law.
Wherefore they gave judgment upon him, [viz.] to stand in the pil-
lory in three several places, and to pay one thousand marks fine, and to
find sureties for his good behaviour during life.35
Hale's statement is the first explicit judicial pronouncement that Chris-
tianity is part of the common law. Until Taylor's Case, blasphemy was
considered an ecclesiastical offense. Hale probably included his Fa-
mous dictum in order to extend the jurisdiction of the civil courts to
include blasphemy. 36 Fifty-two years later, blasphemy became a crimi-
nal offense. In Woolston's Case,37 a clergyman was prosecuted for
making jokes about the miracles performed by Christ. Lord Raymond
rejected the argument that the clergyman's statements were mere differ-
ences of opinion congizable only in ecclesiastical courts. Lord Ray-
mond stated:
I would have it taken notice of, that we not meddle with differences in
33. 2 Corinthians 6:14.
34. Omychund v. Barker, I Atk. 22, Willes 538, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (1744).
35. R. v. Taylor, i Vent. 293, 3 Keb. 607, 86 Eng. Rep. 189 (1676).
36. Bowman v. Secular Society, [1916-171 i All E.R. 1 (1917).
37. R. v. Woolston, 94 Eng. Rep. 655 (1909).
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opinion, and that we interpose only where the very root of Christianity
[is spoken of] . . . . [T]o say, [that] an attempt to subvert the estab-
lish[ed] religion is not punishable by those laws upon which it is estab-
lish[ed] is an absurdity.
38
Although he was a supporter of religious tolerance, Lord Mansfield
also believed that blaspheming Christianity was a crime. In 1767 he
held in Evans v. Chamberlain ofLondon, "The eternal principles of nat-
ural religion are part of the common law; the essential principles of
revealed religion are part of the common law, so that any person revil-
ing, subverting or ridiculing them may be prosecuted at common
law. '" 39 Consequently, the common law crime of blasphemy traces its
origin to the historic battle between the civil and ecclesiastical courts.
In De Costa v. De Paz,4" the English courts handed down perhaps
the most bizarre holding in this area. A bill was brought to enforce a
will of a recently deceased Jew who directed that 1,200 pounds be spent
for the maintenance of a synagogue and the propagation of his faith.
The Lord Chancellor argued that such a charity could not be estab-
lished because it was contrary to the Christian religion and hence Eng-
lish law. Lord Hardwicke, noting that this was not a case where a
charity was set up to aid the Jewish poor, wrote:
[B]ut this is a bequest for the propagation of the Jewish religion, and
though it is said that this is a part of our religion, yet the intent of this
bequest must be taken to be in contradiction to the Christian religion,
which is a part of the law of the land, which is so laid down by Lord
Hale and Lord Raymond; and it undoubtedly is so, for the constitution
and policy of this nation is founded thereon. As to the Act of Tolera-
tion, no new right is given by that, but only an exemption from the
penal laws. The Toleration Act recites the penal laws, and then not
only exempts from those penal laws, but puts the religion of the dissent-
ers under certain regulations and tests. This renders those religions
legal, which is not the case of the Jewish religion, that is not taken
notice of by any law, but is barely connived at by the legislature. 4 I
Accordingly, he declared the law invalid and applied the money to
teaching Christianity. Similarly, in 1819 Lord Eldon held that no one
could establish a charity for the purpose of teaching Judaism, writing,
"I apprehend that it is the duty of every judge presiding in an English
court of justice, when he is told that there is no difference between wor-
shipping the Supreme Being in chapel, church, or synagogue, to recol-
lect that Christianity is part of the law of England. 42
Such pronouncements may not be all that surprising given the devel-
38. Id.
39. 2 R. BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 207 (9th ed. 1842).
40. 2 Swann. 487 (1754).
41. Id at 490.
42. In Re Bedford Charity, 36 Eng. Rep. 696 (1819).
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opment of English jurisprudence. As has been shown, the Church of
England was the established church, and common law judges looked to
Christianity and natural law as the basis for the common law. These
men were active in further developing the body of English common
law and were alive during many of the convulsive battles for control of
the Church of England and the struggle of the king against Parliament.
Given the instability they saw around them, it is not surprising that
they sought to explicitly enshrine Christianity in the law of the land
and punish all those who defiled or failed to support this "established
religion."
IV. THE COLONIAL CONTEXT
Many men and women left England for the New World to escape
these very same battles. With them they brought their language, their
customs, and their laws. Early colonists did not immediately embrace
the common law.4 3 The Puritans of New England were particularly
hostile to it.44 The common law has always exhibited a remarkable
assimilative power, and, therefore, once lawyers came to the colonies in
greater numbers, the common law was accepted in all thirteen colo-
nies.45 The common law was modified to suit American needs. Justice
Story recognized this in Van Ness v. Pacard46 when he held that the
United States has adopted only that portion of the common law appli-
cable to our situation.
The American situation was indeed different. Since many of the set-
tlers came specifically to escape religious persecution,47 it is not surpris-
ing that some measure of religious liberty soon developed in the
colonies. Many other social factors contributed to this trend, including
the colonists' migration within the New World,48 the emergence of new
sects, 49 the small percentage of church members among the colonists,5"
the European experience of established churches,5 the evangelical
Great Awakening movement, 52 Freemasonry,
53 and foreign trade.5 4
43. R. POUND & T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 307.
44. F. POLLOCK, supra note 19, at 57.
45. R. POUND & T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 307.
46. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829).
47. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 3.
48. Id at 21.
49. Id at 21-23.
50. Id. at 23-24. Some scholars have claimed that fewer than one out of eight New En-
glanders were church members. Compare this to the YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN CHURCHES which
reported that in 1962, 63.6% of the population belonged to churches.
51. See id at 24-25.
52. Id at 25-26.
53. Id at 26-28. Freemasons in colonial America strongly opposed an established church,
were nondenominational and friendly towards Jews.
54. Id at 28-29.
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This is not to say that full disestablishment and liberty of conscience
were accomplished quickly or easily in the colonies. Many minority
sects were persecuted in the early colonial period.55 At the time of the
adoption of the federal Constitution, virtually every state had an estab-
lished church, a religious-based voting provision, religious qualifica-
tions for office, religious oaths, or taxes to support Christianity.56 The
first amendment was adopted to address these potential problems at the
federal level.
The Constitution contains no mention of the words "God" or
"Christianity." The only provision that deals with religion is the prohi-
bition of religious tests for office.57 The first amendment provides, in
relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."58 Most
scholars agree that even though contrary opinion surfaced in discus-
sion, the general consensus among the public was that no national
church should be established and that religious liberty should be guar-
anteed.59 Most of the founders believed that questions of religion were
matters of state rather than federal concerns.6" Therefore, the states
were not expressly proscribed from maintaining state churches. Indeed
many established churches lingered on until the middle of the nine-
teenth century.6 The 1940's, however, saw both the establishment and
free exercise clauses incorporated against the states via the fourteenth
amendment.62 As to the establishment clause, the Supreme Court
wrote the following,
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
tions or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
55. See id. at 7.
56. See id. at 562.
57. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 91.
60. Id For an excellent treatment of the adoption of the first amendment, see id. at 90-100.
61. See id at 183.
62. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
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against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall
of separation between church and state."63
In perhaps no other area of the law are the writings of the founders,
specifically Madison and Jefferson, considered more authoritative than
in the area of religious freedom. Madison, the author of the highly
influential "Memorial and Remonstrame" of 1785 against the Virginia
House of Delegates' proposal to provide for teachers of Christianity
through assessments, firmly supported the total separation of church
and state.' He believed that if the state could establish Christianity to
the exclusion of other religions, the state could just as easily establish
one Christian denomination to the exclusion of others.65 Although
Madison apparently never specifically addressed the question of
whether Christianity was part of American common law, he did stead-
fastly believe that Christianity should be allowed to flourish unfettered
from any connection to worldly government or law.66
Along with Madison, Thomas Jefferson is the other great father of
our religious freedom. Stating that the first amendment built "a wall of
separation between Church and State," 67 Jefferson consistently op-
posed any state connection with religion and favored a multiplicity of
religious groups as necessary for progress.68 Jefferson made repeated
references to "natural law" in the Declaration of Independence and
believed that this law recognized that men have certain inalienable
rights which no law could transgress. 69  Consequently, Jefferson be-
lieved that Christianity was not a part of the common law.
In a letter dated 5 June 1824,70 Jefferson declared that the judicial
declaration that Christianity is part of the common law was a "usurpa-
tion of legislative power" which was a judicial "forgery" that consti-
63. Eyerson, 330 U.S. at 15.
64. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 55-61.
65. Id at 56.
66. Id at 57.
67. The phrase appears in his 1 January 1802 reply to an address from the Danbury Baptist
Association, of Connecticut, reprinted in id. at 53. Jefferson was the author of the seminal Virginia
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom-of 1786 which provided that no one would ever be com-
pelled to support any religion and that free exercise would be guaranteed. Although the Bill refers
to "Almighty God" and the "Holy Author of our religion," Jefferson succeeded in blocking an
amendment which would have inserted "Jesus Christ." He felt that by making the Bill
nondedominational he could ensure maximum freedom to all Virginians. Jefferson was so proud
of his authorship of the Bill, a milestone, which Stokes & Pfeffer refer to as "[s]o important. . . in
the history of man's struggle for religious liberty," that his authorship is noted in his epitath. Id
68. Id at 58.
69. That Jefferson believed that this natural law was of divine origin can be seen in the
Declaration's emphatic confession of faith - "we hold these truths to be self-evident . . . that [all
men] . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights .. "
70. The letter is excerpted in I. CORNELISON, THE RELATION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 146 (1970).
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tuted a "conspiracy between church and state."7 ' An Appendix to one
of Jefferson's works amplified this view.7 2 In a rather ancient English
case which questioned the extent that the ecclesiastical law was to be
considered valid in a common law court, Jefferson argued that Judge
Prisot mistakenly translated the Norman French to mean the law
would give credence to "such laws of the church as have warrant in
Holy Scripture" rather then to mean the ancient written laws of the
church.73 Jefferson concluded that because English ecclesiastical law
derives its authority from the common law and Scripture does not,
Prisot was incorrect.74 Jefferson also attacked Hale, Blacktone, and
Mansfield for judicially declaring Christianity to be part of the com-
mon law without ever citing any authority for the proposition. After
finding no support for Hale's statement in any medieval collection of
English laws, Jefferson maintained:
[11f therefore from the settlement of the Saxons to the introduction of
Christianity among them that system of religion could not be a part of
the common law, because they were not yet Christians; and if having
their laws from that period to the close of the common law we are able
to find among them no such act of adoption, we may safely affirm
(though contradicted by all the judges and writers on earth) that Chris-
tianity neither is nor ever was a part of the common law.75
Lastly, Jefferson claimed that since Bracton, Fleta, Britton, Glanvil,
and all the other great jurists who lived between the Norman Conquest
and the year of Hale's statement are silent on the subject, Hale engaged
in judicial legislating.76
In State v. Chandler,77 Chief Justice Clayton of the Delaware
Supreme Court responded to Mr. Jefferson's assertions. Initially Clay-
ton rebuked Jefferson for denouncing Lord Mansfield as a judicial
forger. He noted that Mansfield was a staunch opponent of religious
persecution who had written that "there is nothing. . . more inconsis-
tent with the rights of human nature, more contrary to the spirit and
precepts of the christian religion . . . than persecution."7" Next, Clay-
ton argued that it was Jefferson, not the common law judges, who mis-
construed the ancient Norman French. Clayton interpreted Jefferson
as having said that the ancient case held that the sentence of an ecclesi-
astical tribunal, when warranted by Scripture, "shall be credited in a
71. Id
72. T. JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA
FROM 1730-1740, AND FROM 1768-1772, at 137-42 (1829).
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id at 140.
76. Id at 141.
77. 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837).
78. Id. at 558.
10
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common law court as the decision of a competent tribunal, provided
the ecclesiastical tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction."79 Clayton
noted that this argument is largely irrelevant, because neither Hale,
Mansfield, nor Blackstone ever cited the case as holding that Christian-
ity is part of the common law.8" Lord Hale was "an authority of him-
self and [was] considered as a sufficient authority for a common law
principle in every case where there is no contrary authority."'" There-
fore, Clayton concluded that "Lord Mansfield's alleged judicial forgery
stood, as the cases we have cited prove upon other and many other
authorities than Mr. Jefferson appears to have ever read."82
V. AMERICAN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Article XI of the 1796 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the
United States and Tripoli83 provided:
As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense
founded on the Christian religion-as it has in itself no character of em-
nity against the laws, religion or tranquillity of Musselmen-and as the
said states never have entered into any war or act of hostility against
any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the parties, that no pretext
arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of
the harmony existing between the two countries.
Article VI of the federal Constitution declares that all treaties are the
supreme law of the land and thereby bind all state judges. How can a
state judge, acting in accordance with the Constitution, declare Christi-
anity to be part of American common law? Many scholars have at-
tempted to undercut the authority of the treaty by arguing that article
XI was repealed by subsequent treaties with Islamic nations which omit
this article.8 4 Others argue that the provision is without binding or
precedential effect, and was inserted to only mollify the Turks who
feared that a Christian government would repeal the treaty. That fear
is supported in the language of Lord Coke, "All infidels are, in law,
...perpetual enemies [for the law presumes not that they will be con-
verted, that being . . . a remote possibility], for between them, as with
the [D]evils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpet-
ual hostility, and can be no a peace."85 Virtually every American court
that has confronted this issue has adopted one of these arguments.
79. Id. at 559.
80. Id. at 561.
81. Id at 562.
82. Id. Clayton's opinion barely conceals its contempt for Jefferson's position.
83. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nov. 4, 1796, United States - Tripoli, 8 Stat. 154.
84. I. CORNELISON, supra note 70, at 164.
85. Calvin's case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 397 (1907). See also 2 Corinthains 6:15 ("And what
concord hath Christ with Belial? Or what part hath he that beliveth with an infidel?").
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Indeed, nearly every court which has dealt with the question of
whether Christianity is part of the common law has answered in the
affirmative. In People v. Ruggles, 6 the defendant was charged with
common law blasphemy for publicly proclaiming that "Jesus Christ
was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore.""7 He argued that
whereas Christianity was part of the common law of England, the first
amendment prevented its being part of American law. Moreover, his
speech would be legally protected were he a Jew or Moslem.88 Chancel-
lor Kent, citing Taylor's Case, R. v. Woolsten, and Blackstone 89 rejected
these arguments writing:
The free, equal, and undisturbed, enjoyment of religious opinion,
whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious
subject, is granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious and blas-
phemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole commu-
nity, is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound, by any expressions in
the constitution, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish
at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of
Mahomet or of the grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case
assumes that we are a christian people, and the morality of the country
is deeply ingrafted upon christianity, and not upon the doctrines or
worship of those imposters.
90
Kent concluded by stating that "Christianity, in its enlarged sense, as a
religion revealed and taught in the Bible, is not unknown to our law."'"
During debates over the 1821 New York Constitution, this opinion
was attacked as an establishment of religion and a criminalization of
attendance at a Jewish or Islamic service.92 Kent responded to these
criticisms by arguing that Ruggles' statements:
Were indictable on the same principle as the act of wantonly going
naked, or committing impure and indecent acts in the public streets. It
was not because [C]hristianity was established by law, but because
[C]hristianity was in fact the religion of this country, the rule of our
faith and practice, and the basis of the public morals. Such blasphemy
was an outrage upon public decorum, and if sanctioned by our tribu-
nals would shock the moral sense of the country, and degrade our char-
acter as a christian people. . . . The authors of our constitution never
meant to extirpate christianity. . . Are we not a christian people? Do
not ninety-nine hundredth of our fellow citizens hold the general truths
of the Bible to be dear and sacred? To attack them with reibaldry and
86. 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 291-92.
89. id. at 293 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 59 (blasphemy is the "contumelious
reproach[es] of Christ")).
90. Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 295.
91. Id at 297.
92. New York State Constitutional Convention of 1821, at 462.
505
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1984], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/6
506 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
malice, in the presence of those very believers, must, and ought to be a
serious public offence. It disturbs, and annoys, and offends, and
shocks, and corrupts the public taste. The common law, as applied to
correct such profanity, is the application of common reason and natural
justice to the security of the peace and good order of society.93
Similar views were advanced at other points during the debates. Chief
Justice Spencer argued that the state should adopt an amendment re-
jecting the Ruggles decision.94 Martin van Buren, a future president of
the United States, supported Ruggles adding, however, that no religion
should be established. Rufus King, a future Presidential candidate, ar-
gued that Christianity merited special protection, claiming:
While all mankind are by our constitution tolerated, and free to enjoy
religious profession and worship within this state, yet the religious pro-
fessions of the Pagan, the Mahometan, and the Christian, are not, in the
eye of the law, of equal truth and excellence.
According to the Christian system, men pass into a future state of
existence, when the deeds of their life become the subject of rewards or
punishment-the moral law rests upon the truth of this doctrine, with-
out which it has no sufficient sanction. Our laws constantly refer to this
revelation, and by the oath which they prescribe, we appeal to the
Supreme Being, so to deal with us hereafter, as we observe the obliga-
tion of our oaths.
The Pagan world were, and are, without the mighty influence of this
principle, which is proclaimed in the Christian system-their morals
were destitute of its powerful sanction, while their oaths neither awak-
ened the hopes, nor the fears which a belief in Christianity inspires.
While the constitution tolerates the religious professions and worship
of all men, it does more in behalf of the religion of the gospel-and by
acknowledging, and in certain sense, incorporating its truths into the
laws of the land, we are restrained from adopting the proposed amend-
ment, whereby the Christian religion may lose the security which every
other Christian nation is anxious to afford to it.
9 5
The motion to amend the state constitution to prevent the public sup-
port of Christian worship and to overrule Ruggles by implication was
defeated.96
Relying on the English precedents and Ruggles, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld a blasphemy conviction in Updegraph v. Com-
monwealth . Justice Duncan wrote that "Christianity, general Christi-
anity is, and always has been a part of the common law of
Pennsylvania. . .not Christianity with an established church. . . but
93. Id. at 463.
94. Id. at 574.
95. Id. at 576.
96. Id.
97. 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
13
Spiegel: Christianity as Part of the Common Law
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
CHRISTIANITY
Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men."9 Although "the
laws and institutions of this state are built on the foundation of rever-
ence for christianity,"99 full freedom of worship is guaranteed provided
that such worship does not disturb the public place by publicly villify-
ing Christianity. "
In Vidal v. Girard,' the United States Supreme Court, relying upon
Updegraph, held that Christianity was part of Pennsylvania's common
law. The case concerned a challenge to the will of Stephen Girard who
had devised substantial sums to the establishment of a college for white
male orphans. The will provided that although morality should be
taught, no minister or ecclesiastic should ever be present on the
grounds of the college."°2 The will was challenged on the grounds that
it was "derogatory and hostile to the Christian religion" because, by
excluding ministers from the college, the will prohibited the instruction
of Christianity. 103 Justice Story wrote that although "it is also said, and
truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Penn-
sylvania," the guarantees of religious freedom embodied in the state
constitution extends religious liberty to all sects. "
So that we are compelled to admit that although Christianity be a part
of the common law of the state, yet it is so in this qualified sense, that
its divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be
maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoy-
ance of believers or the injury of the public. Such was the doctrine of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Updegraff v. The Common-
wealth, 11 Serg, and Rawle, 394.
It is unnecessary for us, however, to consider what would be the legal
effect of a devise in Pennsylvania for the establishment of a school or
98. Id at 400.
99. Id. at 403.
100. The court noted that in 1824 no free government was in existence which did not acknowl-
edge Christianity as the religion of the country. Id.
State v. Chandler, see text accompanying note 77-82, reached the same result as Ruggles and
Updegraph. After disposing of Jefferson's views, the court upheld a blasphemy conviction, hold-
ing that the court must take note of the prevailing religion of the people; were the people to
embrace Islam, Islam would then become part of the common law. Were Delawareans to em-
brace Islam, reviling Allah would then become a crime while publicly denouncing Christ thence-
forth be legal, as long as public peace were not disturbed. 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 568 (1837). The fatal
flaw in this argument is that it ignores the fact that the natural law is transcedent. If the common
law codifies natural law, the law cannot be changed merely at whim or because people convert.
Positive law can be changed to reflect a will but the common law cannot. If Christianity were a
basis for the common law, Islam could not supplant it as a basis, although decisions not inconsis-
tent with Islam could be made. The author believes that in the absence of public disturbance,
criminalizations of blasphemy on the ground that a particular religion is part of the common law
cannot be justifiably supported unless heresy itself is a civil crime.
101. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
102. Id. at 143.
103. Id at 185.
104. Id at 198.
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college, for the propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or any other form of
infidelity. 
0 5
The court then held that the will was valid, because laymen, as well as
ministers, could teach Christian morals to the orphans.
0 6
Prosecuting violations of Sunday closing laws gave rise to many of
the cases which hold that Christianity is part of the common law. City
Council of Charleston v. Benjamin,"°7 was such a case. In Benjamin, a
Jewish glover challenged the city's Sunday closing laws. Benjamin ar-
gued that as a Sabatarian who could not work on Sundays, he was
compelled to either lose money by not working on Saturdays or violate
his religious scruples which prohibit working on Saturdays. The
Charleston Court emphasized that the guarantees of religious liberty in
the state constitution permitted undisturbed religious observance by all
South Carolinians and, therefore, the City Council could not compel a
Jew to observe Sunday as the Sabbath. Judge O'Neall wrote:
It was that same glorious spirit of mercy and love, which proclaimed
the birth of the Saviour, and as its consequence, "peace, good will to-
wards men." It was that same Christianity, which sought its promul-
gators among the humblest of the Jews, and taught them, "love your
enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them which hate you,
and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you." But
this toleration, thus granted, is a religious toleration; it is the free exer-
cise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, with two provi-
sions, one of which, that which guards against acts of licentiousness,
testifies to the Christian construction, which this section should
receive.' 
08
The court maintained, notwithstanding the guarantees of religious lib-
erty, that it could safely say that since Christianity and good morals
were synonymous, blasphemy and divorce were proscribed.'0 9 How-
ever, these laws, like the Sunday closing laws, cannot be construed as
105. Id
106. This case is cited for the proposition that Christianity is part of the common law of the
United States. In fact, since a state law and not a federal question was presented, any decision
beyond that Christianity was part of the law of Pennsylvania was extraneous. See Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (Story, J.) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to enforce a devise
for the establishment of an "Infidel Society" writing:
It is in entire consistency with this sacred guarantee of the rights of conscience and religious
liberty to hold that, even if Christianity is no part of the law of the land, it is the popular
religion of the country, an insult to which would be indictable as directly tending to disturb
the public peace. The laws and institutions of this state are built on the foundation of rever-
ence for Christianity. To this extent, at least, it must certainly be considered as well settled
that the religion revealed in the Bible is not to be openly reviled, ridiculed or blasphemed, to
the annoyance of sincere believers who compose the great mass of the good people of the
Commonwealth.
Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465, 471 (1870).
107. 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508 (1846).
108. Id. at 522.
109. 1d. at 523.
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violating any free exercise right. They are health and welfare regula-
tions by the police for the good of the people and neither compel nor
prohibit any form of worship."O Accordingly, the law was upheld.
During the 19th century, Pennsylvania courts consistently rejected
religious challenges to Sunday closing laws. The courts, in language
similar to that employed in the Benjamin opinion, stressed that al-
though religious toleration was guaranteed, Christian institutions were
entitled to special respect. Perhaps the most emphatic holding was in
Mohney v. Cook:"'.
The declaration that Christianity is part of the law of the land, is a
summary description of an existing and very obvious condition of our
institutions. We are a Christian people, in so far as we have entered
into the spirit of Christian institutions, and become imbued with the
sentiments and principles of Christianity; and we cannot be imbued
with them, and yet prevent them from entering into and influencing,
more or less, all our social institutions, customs, and relations, as well
as all our individual modes of thinking and acting. It is involved in our
social nature, that even those among us who reject Christianity, cannot
possibly get clear of its influence, or reject those sentiments, customs,
and principles which it has spread among the people, so that, like the
air we breathe, they have become the common stock of the whole coun-
try, and essential elements of its life.
It is perfectly natural, therefore, that a Christian people should have
laws to protect their day of rest from desecration. Regarding it as a day
necessarily and divinely set apart for rest from worldly employments,
and for the enjoyment of spiritual privileges, it is simply absurd to sup-
pose that they would leave it without any legislative protection from the
disorderly and immoral. The sentiment that sustains it must find ex-
pression through those who are elected to represent the will of their
constituents. 1 f
Relying on Ruggles and state Constitutional debates, a New York
110. Id. at 527.
111. 26 Pa. 342 (1855).
112. Id. at 347-48. See also Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Barr. 312, 325 (Pa. 1848) ("In a
Christian community, where a very large majority of the people celebrate the first day of the week
as their chosen period of rest from labor, it is not surprising that they should have received the
legislative sanction.")
Other courts have also upheld Sunday closing legislation on the same basis:
Sunday or the Sabbath is properly and emphatically called the Lord's day, and is one
amongst the first and most sacred institutions of the christian religion. This system of religion
is recognized as constituting a part and parcel of the common law, and as such all the institu-
tions growing out of it, or, in any way, connected with it, in case they shall not be found to
interfere with the rights of conscience, are entitled to the most profound respect, and can
rightfully claim the protection of the law making-power of the State.
Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 263 (1850). See also Richmond v. Moore, 107 Ill. 429, 435 (1884)
("When the great body of the people are Christians ... our laws and institutions must necessarily
be based upon and embody the teachings of the Redeemer of mankind. It is impossible that it
should be otherwise .... [Ojur civilization and institutions are emphatically Christian .
Adams v. Gay, 19 Utah 365 (1847).
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court upheld a Sunday closing law in Lindenmuller v. The People.113
The court held that a day of rest could be established by the legislature
and that religion was not established merely because the legislature had
selected the day upon which the majority of the people chose to rest for
religious reasons.' '4 Judge Allen wrote:
It would be strange that a people, christian in doctrine and worship,
many of whom or whose forefathers had sought these shores for the
privilege of worshipping God in simplicity and purity of faith, and who
regarded religion as the basis of their civil liberty, and the foundation
of their rights, should, in their zeal to secure to all the freedom of con-
science which they valued so highly, solemnly repudiate and put be-
yond the pale of the law, the religion which was dear to them as life,
and dethrone the God who, they openly and avowedly professed to
believe, had been their protector and guide as a people."
Significantly, despite the dicta claiming that Christianity is part of
the common law, the courts upheld Sunday closing legislation on po-
lice power grounds. In upholding Maryland's Sunday closing law
against an establishment clause challenge, the United States Supreme
Court, in 1961, again recognized that the state may order stores to close
on a given day and that otherwise valid legislation would not be struck
down solely because it coincided with the views of a religious group. I ,
6
Several mid-nineteenth century cases which involved Sunday closing
laws, provided courts with opportunities to deny that Christianity was
part of the common law. In Bloom v. Richards,"l the Ohio Supreme
Court upheld the Ohio Sunday closing law on secular grounds. The
Court specifically stated that the law would be invalid had it been en-
acted for any religious purpose."" It was insignificant that the day
selected by the legislature was the day on which most people would
refuse to work.' 19 However, the court specifically held, because of the
wording of the state constitutional provision "that no preference shall
ever be given, by law, to any religious society or mode of worship,"' 2 °
that neither "Christianity, [n]or any other system of religion, is a part of
the law of the state."'
12 '
113. 33 Barb. 548 (N.Y. 1861).
114. Id. at 571.
115. Id. at 561.
116. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Note that the Constitution provides, "[l]f
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the same shall be a law . U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (emphasis
added).
117. 2 Ohio St. 387 (1863).
118. Id. at 391.
119. Id. at 392.
120. Id at 390.
121. Id
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In Ex Parte Newman,'22 the California Supreme Court held that an
enactment entitled the "Act to provide for the better observance of the
Sabbath" was invalid, as discriminating in favor of one religion over
the other. Chief Justice Terry's majority opinion maintained that the
statute, as drafted, amounted to an establishment of religion.'23 Chief
Justice Terry, also questioned the propriety of the legislature's mandat-
ing a uniform amount of rest, when individual physiologies may de-
mand a greater or lesser amount of rest. 24 The concurring opinion of
Justice Burnett contained the following significant language:
We often meet with the expression that Christianity is a part of the
common law. Conceding that this is true, it is not perceived how it can
influence the decision of a constitutional question. The Constitution of
this State will not tolerate any discrimination or preference in favor of
any religion; and, so far as the common law conflicts with this provi-
sion, it must yield to the Constitution. Our constitutional theory re-
gards all religions, as such, equally entitled to protection, and all
equally unentitled to any preference. Before the Constitution they are
all equal. In so far as the principles found in all, or any one or more of
the different religious systems, are considered applicable to the ends
legitimately contemplated by civil constitutional government, they can
be embodied in our laws and enforced. But when there is no ground or
necessity upon which a principle can rest, but a religious one, then the
Constitution steps in, and says that you shall not enforce it by authority
of law.1
25
Though specifically based on the California Constitution, the thrust of
Burnett's opinion is that if Christianity were ever part of the common
law, it would be overruled by first amendment.
In 1872, a group of Cincinnati taxpayers sought to enjoin the city's
Board of Education from enforcing its resolutions which would require
that a Bible reading and appropriate singing begin each school day. 1
26
Citing Bloom v. Richards127 and the treaty with Tripoli, the taxpayers
claimed that since Christianity was not part of the law of Ohio, reading
the King James version of the Bible and instructing children in religion
violated the liberty of conscience guaranteed by the Constitution.
28
Along with other defenses, the Board argued that the treaty with Trip-
oli is the only late 18th century American treaty which does not recog-
nize America's religious traditions. 29 Moreover, the Board argued that
122. 18 Cal. 679 (1861), rev'd sub nom. Ex Parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 (1861).
123. Id. at 507.
124. Id. at 509.
125. Id at 513. See also State v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663 (1879) (Christianity is not part of the
law of Louisiana because Louisiana is not a common law state).
126. Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872).
127. 2 Ohio St. 387 (1863).
128. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 217.
129. Id at 234.
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cases such as Ruggles, Updegraff, Vidal, and Chandler correctly stated
the relationship between Christianity and the common law. 130
The court feared that the Board intended to teach doctrinal Christi-
anity through this scheme. Judge Welsh, in perhaps the most vocifer-
ous judicial denial that Christianity is part of the common law, wrote:
We are told that [the word religion as used in the resolutions] must
mean "Christian religion," because "Christianity is a part of the com-
mon law of this country," lying behind and above its constitutions.
Those who make this assertion can hardly be serious, and intend the
real import of their language. If Christianity is a law of the state, like
every other law, it must have a sanction. Adequate penalties must be
provided to enforce obedience to all its requirements and precepts. No
one seriously contends for any such doctrine in this country, or, I might
almost say, in this age of the world. The only foundation-rather, the
only excuse-for the proposition, that Christianity is part of the law of
this country, is the fact that it is a Christian country, and that its consti-
tutions and laws are made by a Christian people. And is not the very
fact that those laws do not attempt to enforce Christianity, or to place it
upon exceptional or vantage ground, itself a strong evidence that they
are the laws of a Christian people, and that their religion is the best and
purest of religions? It is strong evidence that their religion is indeed a
religion "without partiality," and therefore a religion "without hypoc-
risy." True Christianity asks no aid from the sword of civil authority. It
began without the sword, and whereever it has taken the sword it has
perished by the sword. To depend on civil authority for its enforce-
ment is to acknowledge its own weakness, which it can never afford to
do. It is able to fight its own battles. Its weapons are moral and
spiritual ... 131
Judge Welsh argued that since Christianity cannot be enforced in the
courts and lacks sanctions, it is not the law of the state. Under this
interpretation, it would be impossible for a court to uphold a convic-
tion for common law blasphemy if no disturbance of the peace could
be shown, since the common law cannot protect Christianity where it
does not protect all other religions. In Taylor's Case, Judge Hale at-
tempted to judicially enforce Christianity through a blasphemy statute.
By implication, Judge Welsh rejects Hale's approach.
In 1887, the Holy Trinity Church hired a London pastor as rector
and paid his passage to New York. The church was then charged with
violating a federal law which prohibited anyone from hiring a foreigner
and paying his passage to the United States. 32 The United States
130. Id at 235.
131. Id at 246-47. Cf. State v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882).
132. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332, repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 177,
§ 403(a)(2), 66 Stat. 279.
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Supreme Court reversed the conviction,' 33 with Justice Brewer noting
that the statute had been designed to prevent large capitalists from pre-
paying the passage of cheap foreign laborers. Accordingly, the statute
was not intended to prohibit churches from paying the transportation
of any foreign ministers it might hire. Moreover, wrote Justice Brewer,
any law which accomplished that result would violate our Christian
heritage.'34 Citing Updegraph, Ruggles, and Vidal the court concluded:
If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life, as expressed
by its laws, its business, its customs, and its society, we find everywhere
a clear recognition of the same truth. Among other matters note the
following: The form of oath universally prevailing, concluding with an
appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions of all delibera-
tive bodies and most conventions with prayer; the prefatory words of
all wills, "In the name of God, amen;" the laws respecting the obser-
vance of the Sabbath, with the general cessation of all secular business,
and the closing of courts, legislatures, and other similar public assem-
blies on that day; the churches and church organizations which abound
in every city, town, and hamlet; the multitude of charitable organiza-
tions existing everywhere under Christian auspices; the gigantic mis-
sionary associations, with general support, and aiming to establish
Christian missions in every quarter of the globe. These, and many
other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial decla-
rations to the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation.
In the face of all these, shall it be believed that a congress of the United
States intended to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country
to contract for the services of a Christian minister residing in another
nation? 135
In 1931, the Supreme Court once again declared that "We are a
Christian people."' 36 However, by 1952, the Court would only declare
that "we are a religious people."'' 37 Additionally, the House of Lords
in 1917, reversing three hundred years of legal history, declared that
Christianity is in fact not part of the common law.'3 Like many others
in this area, the litigation concerned the validity of a bequest to an
"anti-[C]hristian society." In an exhaustive opinion which painstak-
ingly traced the development of Christianity as part of the common
law, the Lords concluded that the bequest was valid.' 39 Of the five
opinions submitted, Lord Summer's analysis of the blasphemy cases
133. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
134. Id. at 465.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931).
137. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). But see Snavely v. Booth, 36 Del. 378, 388,
170 A. 649, 653 (1935). (The "Christian religion . . . is part of our common law"); Common-
wealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 138, 138 A. 497, 499 (1927) ("Christianity is part
of the common law of Pennsylvania, and its people are Christian people").
138. Bowman v. Secular Soc'y, 11916-17] 1 All E.R. 1 (1917).
139. Id. at 32.
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correctly concluded that had the judges been concerned with civil dis-
order instead of extirpating heresy, they would have realized that "to
insult a Jew's religion is not less likely to provoke a fight than to insult
an Episcopalians', and on the other hand, the publication of a dull vol-
ume of blasphemies may well provoke nothing worse than throwing it
into the fire."' 4° The essence of his lengthy opinion is captured in the
following:
My Lords, with all respect for the great names of the lawyers who
have used it, the phrase 'Christianity is part of the law of England' is
really not law; it is rhetoric, as truly so as was Erskine's peroration
when prosecuting Williams: 'No man can be expected to be faithful to
the authority of man, who revolts against the Government of God.'
One asks what part of our law may Christianity be, and what part of
Christianity may it be that is part of our law? Best, C.J. once said in
Bird v. Holbrook, (1828) 4 Bing. 628, 641, 130 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 911,
(a case of injury by setting a spring-gun): 'There is no act which Chris-
tianity forbids that the law will not reach: if it were otherwise, Christi-
anity would not be, as it has always been held to be, part of the law of
England'; but this was rhetoric too. Spring-guns, indeed, were got rid
of, not by Christianity, but by Act of Parliament. 'Thou shalt not steal'
is part of our law. 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' is part of our law,
but another part, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' is not part of
our law at all. Christianity has tolerated chattel slavery; not so the
present law of England. Ours is, and always has been, a Christian
State. The English family is built on Christian ideas, and if the na-
tional religion is not Christian there is none. English law may well be
called a Christian law, but we apply many of its rules and most of its
principles, with equal justice and equally good government, in heathen
communities, and its sanction, even in courts of conscience, are mate-
rial and not spiritual.'1
4
Over the years, many publicists have supported a doctrine which
would make Christianity part of American common law. Daniel Web-
ster proclaimed that "general, tolerant Christianity, is the law of the
land." 42 Cooley took a more restricted view, writing that:
Christianity is not a part of the law of the land in any sense which
entitles the courts to take notice of and base their judgments upon it,
except so far as they can find that its precepts and principles have been
incoporated in and made a component part of the positive law of the
state.
4 3
However, others have denied that Christianity is part of the common
law. Writing in 1902, Arthur W. Barber posited an Austinian ap-
proach. He maintained that unless the courts could enforce the
140. Id at 28.
141. Id at 30, 31.
142. Barber, Christianity and the Common Law, 14 THE GREEN BAG 267 (1902).
143. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 670 (22d ed. 1871).
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precepts of Christianity, Christianity would be "a law without a sanc-
tion, and become an absurdity in logic as well as a nullity in fact.'
Since Christianity is a religion, it must be enforced by moral and spiri-
tual persuasion, not by legal authority. Although our institutions have
demonstrably benefited from Scriptual teachings,' 45 the "fact that the
society is Christian in its faith and sympathies is important only as de-
termining the form and spirit of those laws."'
146
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine that Christianity is part of the common law originated
in an England that had an established church and did not emphasize
religious liberty. Although dispute surrounds the earliest opinion
which cites the doctrine for a blasphemy conviction, some emanations
from the doctrine may not be entirely without merit in the English ju-
risprudential system. The common law is a system wherein judges use
reason to ascertain the principles which, in the absence of statutes,
should govern human behavior. The common law tradition is meshed
with natural law; a universal law applicable to all men in all situa-
tions. 147 It is this common law judges derive by the use of reason.
Since the early English judges were clerics, it is not surprising that they
appealed to Christianity as the ratio decidendi. Moreover, the estab-
lishment of the Church of England, with the sovereign at its head, fur-
ther entangled the legal system and religion.
The establishment of a state supported church in the United States
was expressly prohibited by the first amendment and no doubt spared
us from the religious strife which tormented the English. However, al-
though the first amendment absolutely prohibits the state from directly
or indirectly punishing someone for a violation of a religious creed, the
Constitution does not require the legal nor political system to renounce
those principles of Judaeo-Christian ethics and morality that we have
cherished for three centuries. The American courts which have held
that Christianity is part of the common law were proclaiming that our
institutions are indeed based upon those principles. The bulk of the
case law in this area derives from a now discredited school of thought
which tolerated, to the exclusion of all other faiths, an extensive entan-
glement between the state and the Christian religion. Nevertheless,
these cases represent an attempt to recognize the moral content of our
laws. While this author does not propose a revival of these precedents,
there are certain timeless, transcendent moral and ethical precepts that
144. Barber, supra note 142, at 267-68.
145. Id at 270.
146. Id at 273.
147. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 141 (M. Ostwald trans. & ed. 1962).
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undergird our law. Since we derive the moral force of our law from
these precepts, we should be willing to recognize their contribution to
our freedom.
23
Spiegel: Christianity as Part of the Common Law
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
